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Introduction 
With the recent advents of the World-Wide Web, multimedia, and ubiquitous 
computing technologies connecting an incredibly huge and still rapidly growing number 
of heterogeneous information resources, the task of supplying users with an adequate 
means for accessing these resources – the task of hypermedia system design – has 
become too difficult to solve, relying merely on empirical- and common sense- level 
decision procedures. A hypermedia system (a relatively new term that usually refers to a 
user interface of a distributed multimedia database) deals with information organized 
and stored in network structures consisting of nodes (which are representations of 
different media types – sound, texts, images, video, etc.), links (which implement 
physical passages between nodes), and scripts (which direct the time dynamics of links), 
and it thus enables hypermedia-based communication – the cognitive processing by the 
system’s user that includes selecting, organizing, and integrating information 
represented over time in the connected nodes (Jackson 1997). Since the invention of 
hypertext – the predecessor and, in a sense, degenerated case of hypermedia, many 
attempts have been made to formulate a scientific theory that would provide systematic 
guidelines for the design and development of hypermedia systems (Bush 1945; Nelson 
1967; also see Bardini 1997 for an overview). 
 
It may be said that a theory is satisfactory as far as it allows for comprehensive analysis 
and prediction of certain phenomena or else guarantees a pragmatic application. In the 
case of hypermedia systems, the phenomena in focus are human communication 
phenomena. It is then only natural that a large group of design approaches endeavor to 
apply the Shannon-Weaver Communication Theory by borrowing its conceptual 
apparatus and analytical procedures to develop information systems for efficient and 
effective communication (e.g. de Souza 1993). Another large and alternative group of 
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design approaches build on various methodologies (e.g. those of the Object-Oriented 
Design paradigm), which pay little attention to understanding the processes underlying 
human communication but, instead, strive to generalize and extend the best-known 
software engineering practice to new design cases (e.g. Beaudouin-Lafon 2000). While 
this twofold classification may appear too coarse and simplistic, it should suffice to 
justify our claim that most of the currently available approaches to hypermedia system 
design can hardly be considered satisfactory. 
 
By formalizing communication as the transmission of meaning – a perception or idea – 
from a sender to the receiver, the classical (Shannon and Weaver’s) communication 
theory has made statistical modeling a powerful tool for the analysis of various 
communication processes. However, as long as there is no brain scanning device that 
would explicitly reveal what is the meaning sent and received, this theory will fail to 
provide a reliable analysis of human communication. On the other hand, by substituting 
a theory with a methodology – no matter how general or ‘natural’ – one never touches 
the theory per se but is forced to continually adapt methodological procedures to a 
potentially infinite number of communication situations and develop ‘meta-
methodologies’ (vernacularly called ‘ontologies’ in computer sciences) to systematize 
these situations that, in practice, result in unmanageably complicated and contrived 
design models. 
 
It is likely that any theory of information system design has to be based on a theory of 
communication. The difficulties with the development of such a theory arise from the 
apparent necessity to concurrently address two seemingly incompatible aspects of 
computer-mediated communication: communication as a physical – technological, 
measurable, and fairly predictable – process, and as a mental – in effect experiential, 
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partially unconscious, and observationally emergent – phenomenon. A communication 
theory has therefore to locate itself somewhere between two perils of category error: the 
error of models identifying communication as a mere physical act, and 
epiphenomenalism – theories struggling to remove any physical grounding (particularly 
causality) when describing communication. In seeking to avoid the evident dangers, 
scientists investigating communication and, lately, information and hypermedia 
systems, have been quick to adopt philosophies, specifically semiotics, that steer clear 
of the absolutization of either the physical or mental by recognizing and explicitly 
defining connections between these two, proceeding from the very conceptual level. 
Two questions, however, come up at this point: whether the mental can be approached 
in the same way as the physical (principally, can it be in any way ‘measured’ and 
predicted) and if so, is a communication theory to be a distinct scientific discipline with 
its own conceptual and philosophical basis and mathematical tools, but not an 
empirically tailored unstable compromise between technology, physiology, and the 
humanities – psychology, sociology, and linguistics? In the present article, we 
investigate these questions. 
 
Information and hypermedia system design theories are divided according to a 
transmission/interpretation distinction, and the weak and strong points of each group are 
examined. Next, we formulate definitions and propositions on a concise but transparent 
axiomatic basis, which allow us to uniformly describe the mental, physical, and social 
phenomena of communication. In so doing, we proceed from the assumption that 
although it may be difficult to unequivocally define communication from positions of a 
single discipline, it will always involve some autonomous behavior (e.g. human-human 
and human-computer interactions) constituting a communication language, as well as 
autonomous dynamic environments – physical and social that impose constraints – 
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principal and potential – on this language. The latter determines our choice of system 
theory and sociology as the source of conceptual ideas; semiotics comes as a general 
philosophy to effectively organize all the different concepts within one coherent 
framework, and physics provides major inspirations as to how the communication 
mechanism would ‘work,’ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Keeping the 
technicalities as few as possible and the notations as simple as possible, we give 
nonetheless a rigorous mathematical interpretation of the proposed conceptualizations 
that in fact constitutes the core of what we would call ‘Quantitative Semiotics.’ We then 
derive a statistical model that explains and predicts fluctuations of representations in 
human communication and attempt to not only conceptually but also statistically justify 
the equivalence of Peircian and de Saussure’s semiotic modeling, which initially 
emerges as merely a ‘by-product’ of the proposed axiomatization. This article describes 
two experiments conducted to illustrate and validate the developed approach and 
discusses the theoretical findings in a context of prior research. 
 
Communication Models and the Design of Information Systems 
Most of the modern approaches to the design of information systems utilize one of the 
two contending, though not completely alienated conceptualizations of the early 
Stimulus-Response Model of behavioral psychology, which set about with the 
communication process as either the transmission of messages or the development of 
meaning. The modeling of the message transmission goes back to Shannon and 
Weaver’s mathematical theory of communication and its ‘conveyor-tube’ framework 
first proposed half a century ago for solving the technical problem of excessive physical 
noise in communication channels (Shannon and Weaver 1949). In the past decades, this 
model has significantly been improved upon and adapted to a variety of domains, 
making it a widely-considered general model for communication studies. 
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Notwithstanding the changes made to date, the basic concept of communication as 
transmission of messages remains the core of the approach, and in whatever terms a 
transmission-focused model is described, whether they be probabilistic, software 
engineering, or semiotic, it postulates that: 
 
• there is an active source of information – the sender who ‘encodes’ her or his 
idea or perception (in other words, meaning) into a message; 
• the message is sent through a channel (or medium) to its destination – the 
receiver who ‘decodes’ the message and provides feedback; 
• upon completing the transmission attempt, the sender’s and the receiver’s 
information may differ, owing to the noisy channel-medium and/or alterations 
caused by the encoding and decoding; 
• besides the sender and receiver, there is an observer, which can yet be 
identical to either of the communicating two, who intervenes in the process by 
determining the successfulness (or efficiency) of communication through 
comparison of original and received meanings. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of communication as the transmission of messages in 
hypermedia system design. The operation of an information system (e.g. a multimedia 
database) is locally realized through its interface, which is composed of messages. 
These messages can be about the system domain, the computational domain, and about 
the user’s possible interactions with the interface. Both the system and the user can send 
and receive information, and a computational data model implemented in the computer 
program plays the role of an observer, determining the ‘correct’ (i.e. successfully 
‘understood’) messages and interactions. This data model reflects an individual’s (e.g. 
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Figure 1: Information system and the transmission of messages. 
the designer’s) comprehension of the domain, structure, and functioning of the system 
that is encoded and sent to the user through the interface. 
 
In his work (Goguen 1999) on a distributed system user interface, Joseph A. Goguen, a 
computer theorist, gives a formally well-elaborated and intuitively appealing example of 
the application of a transmission-focused model of communication. To mathematically 
define the model, the author develops the novel technique called ‘algebraic semiotics,’ 
which puts forward an algebraic interpretation of de Saussure’s Semiology (de Saussure 
1974). A user interface is characterized in terms of a ‘semiotic morphism’ that is a 
mapping (i.e. translation or re-representation) from a ‘cognitive’ sign system 
representing the communication situation (e.g. as conceived by the designer) to an 
‘external’ sign system (e.g. a language) representing the user interface, where a sign 
system is a formal concept somewhat resembling the notion of context-free grammar. It 
is argued that determining properties of the corresponding semiotic morphism can help 
evaluate the user interface functionality and quality. In particular, it is argued that in 
human communication, morphisms preserving structure have a higher priority and are 
(ethnomethodologically) more important and ‘better’ than morphisms preserving 
content. The paper describes the application of the devised model to designing user 
interfaces of a distributed collaborative system, and it reports the experiences with 
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regard to using them. While the developed interfaces retain logical consistency even in 
rather complicated operational situations, it remains to be seen why and under which 
circumstances they would provide efficient and effective communication. 
 
The author sought to justify the design solutions through studies of ethnography, social 
science, and linguistics which build on characteristics of communication that are 
average or common for a certain community, e.g. a group of system users. The appeal to 
semiotics, however, appears weak: the paper does not explain but rather makes it 
difficult to see if and how anything (but the terminology?) of this discipline can assist 
the designer in coping with the complexity of communication begotten by numerous 
socially converging but still experiential, subjective, and never uniform processes of 
information transmission. Furthermore, by utilizing the approach ‘as is,’ one could 
hardly rationalize the introduction of the cognitive and social ‘dimensions’ (i.e. the two 
distinct sign systems) for modeling the communication process. 
 
Communication models of the second, interpretation-focused class concentrate on the 
process of signification – the perception of various objects by humans. With conceptual 
traces back to the Middle Ages, these models are nowadays habitually associated with 
the Peircean vision of a semiotic triad connecting a (physical) sign (i.e. representamen) 
with its object (i.e. that what it signifies – a signified in de Saussure’s terms) by 
meaning (i.e. signifier), which may or may not be another sign, that is the conceived 
sense made of the first sign (Peirce 1998). In information system design, the application 
of such a model (frequently simply called ‘semiotic model’) is concerned with the 
generating and exchange of meaning, when the divergence of (sent and received) 
meaning is not a failure but a natural attribute of communication. In a semiotic model, 
communication is dealt with as the development and re-interpretation of signs that are 
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Figure 2: Semiosis of hypermedia-based communication. 
representations of physical or mental entities. A semiotic model of communication 
postulates that:  
 
• there are no senders and receivers – they are uniformly represented and 
effectively replaced by interpretants, i.e. by those which follow semantically 
from the processes of interpretation; 
• not a message but meaning emerges, which is externalized and (re)determined 
through interactions between a carrier (e.g. gesture, text, picture, sound, and 
the like) and the culture (i.e. the social system standing for it); 
• decisive notions, like ‘correct’ or ‘successful,’ are subject to both individual 
(i.e. experiential) assessment and socio-cultural convergence or compromise. 
 
Figure 2 depicts a semiotic model of hypermedia-based communication. The interface is 
built of nodes comprised of signs. The signs are to represent the states or, in other 
words, ‘meaning’ of psychic (or conscious) systems. This meaning is externalized with 
signifieds (generally seen as behavior; in other words – objects), which may prompt the 
‘generation’ of signifiers (i.e. signs standing for something, or interpretants) through 
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interaction with the social system. The interface is a (partial) realization of the social 
system state, while signs are individually interpreted but necessarily have socially- and 
culturally-induced meaning. There can be more than one social system but, 
tautologically, no communication is possible beyond a social system. All the systems 
involved have internal (time-)dynamics affecting their output: signifieds/objects in the 
case of psychic systems, and signifiers and signs in the case of social systems. 
 
Peter B. Andersen sketched the range and applicability of the semiotic models for 
human-computer interaction (Andersen 1990). It was argued that whenever computation 
and interpretation have an effect on each other, they can and should be studied 
semiotically, and that not only straight human-computer interaction, but also any 
storage and retrieval of data are communicative processes. Building on the knowledge 
of older and traditional semiotic disciplines, such as literature and art, the author 
discusses and elaborates on the following points: i) the interface of an information 
system should agree with and expose what really goes on behind the interface, i.e. it 
should reveal the ‘actual’ semantics of the reality and hence be grounded upon the 
experience of sense; and ii) apart from being interpretable (at least potentially), the 
interface should be verbalizable in terms of the user’s work-language that may be seen 
as a realization of the corresponding social system. 
 
The recent work (Andersen 2001) provides a design example that illustrates these two 
issues. It is shown that projecting features from verbal communication onto the user 
interface can enhance the communicability of a multimedia computer system. The 
developed interface is expected to be effective and efficient for a social group 
delineated by the users’ ability to comprehend the language employed. A serious 
drawback of this and many other semiotic (i.e. interpretation-inclined) models is, 
however, that specific concepts, the terms with which the models are defined, are based 
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on introspection and therefore lack formal precision that makes it problematic to use 
them on a computational basis (e.g. see Schmidt-Isler 2000; Condon 2000). This, to a 
large extent, results from the noticeably confusing array of contemporary semiotic 
theories, which build on diverse, personal, and formally vague but intricate 
conceptualizations while describing the same phenomena. 
 
Being quite aware of the risk of perplexing the reader with the terminology, we 
nevertheless deliberately presented two examples, where the conceptually dissimilar but 
semiotic terms were deployed to formulate the principles for designing hypermedia 
systems. Our motivation is that most naturally, communication is indeed a semiotic 
phenomenon, and the two perspectives – one focused on the transmission, and another 
on interpretation – correspond to two distinct but overlapping parts of semiotics named 
by Umberto Eco as Theory of Sign Production and Theory of Codes, respectively (Eco 
1976). Semiotics offers a common basis for discussing, analyzing, and designing 
information systems, and the two different approaches to modeling communication can 
be related to studying two aspects of interpretation of the same sign: as an object which 
is interpreted (e.g. a sign in Goguen’s sign system, which is, in itself, a system of 
interpretance) and as an object of interpretation (e.g. meaning in Andersen’s terms). The 
latter could also be posed as an ordered pair of objects interpreted, which are defined on 
two systems of interpretance accommodating syntax for one element of the pair, and 
semantics for the other (e.g. as in Sonesson 2002). 
 
Now to summarize: each of the popular design approaches surveyed in this section has 
serious limitations in modeling human communication. Just as the use of the semiotic 
terminology alone cannot make a statistically justified conveyer-tube framework 
capable of handling the complexity and subjectivism of hypermedia-based 
communication, even a thorough semiotic analysis cannot ‘automatically’ make the task 
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of hypermedia system design more understandable or more easily formalizable and thus 
controllable. The separate treatments of the different aspects of interpretation eventually 
led the authors of these, as well as many other modeling approaches, to the study of 
information (re)representation with little attention to the measurable and reproducible 
(i.e. epistemologically objective, as opposed to introspective) characteristics and 
consequences of communication that, in many practical cases, made analyzing and 
designing hypermedia systems ad hoc, ambiguous, and largely unpredictable. 
 
(‘Quantitative’) Semiotics of (Hypermedia) Systems 
The strongest point of the Stimulus-Response Model and its classical (Shannon and 
Weaver’s) mathematical interpretation is that it allows for statistically modeling and 
therefore predicting the effect of a single act of message transmission (or series of such 
acts unchanging in condition), provided that one can measure ‘the amount of’ meaning, 
the efficiency of its coding, or determine the ‘noise properties’ (i.e. to what extent it 
would alter the conveyed perception or idea) of the medium-channel. Looking at the 
process more carefully, however, one quickly finds that this model does not and cannot 
work in a general case, e.g. in hypermedia-based communication, where the receiver’s 
meaning appears a result of the cognitive processing of a number of stochastically 
independently generated and often incomplete messages, rather than one stationary 
decoding process. The principal problem is that the Stimulus-Response Model cannot, 
in its canonic form, account for the fact that meaning is not transmitted from a single 
source, but created in the mind of the receiver (i.e. interpreter), based at best in part on 
the sender’s message but also – on social and idiosyncratic parameters of the 
communication situation, and yet sometimes regardless of the sender’s original 
intention. In seeking to overcome this modeling deficiency, we will first re-define 
communication in such a way as to avoid the necessity of conjecturing about and 
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(directly or otherwise) assessing the ‘inner contents’ (i.e. possessed information, 
meaning, etc.) of the communicating parties to estimate the efficiency (correctness, etc.) 
of the process of meaning ‘exchange’. 
 
From positions of evolutionary structuralism (see Maturana and Varela 1980), 
communicative activities can be grouped into a specific category of observed behavior 
of self-organizing systems, such as humans or other animals. The principal property of a 
self-organizing system is its autonomy in respect to the environment: the system state at 
any time is determined solely by the system’s structure and previous state. The system 
cannot be controlled from the outside, and environmental perturbations can only be a 
potential cause for the changing of the system state. Hence, all observed behavior – the 
output – of a self-organizing system is a result of its inner state and history. Through 
behavior, the system can interact with the environment that may cause it to change its 
structure, so that the system becomes structurally coupled with the environment. It is 
said that the coupled system undergoes self-adaptation, when the system and its 
dynamic environment mutually trigger their inner states. The self-adaptation processes 
of several systems embedded in the same environment may become coupled, 
recursively acting through their own states. All the possible changes of states of such 
systems, which do not terminate this coupling, establish a consensual domain. Behavior 
in a consensual domain is mutually orienting. Communication can fundamentally be 
defined as the observed behavioral coordination developed from the interactions 
between autonomous self-organizing systems in the consensual domain (di Paolo 1998). 
 
Inspired by the conceptual compatibility of system theory, quantum physics, and 
semiotics (see Nadin 1999 for a relevant discussion), we will begin formalizing the 
Kryssanov     14
 
system-theoretic account of the communication process by introducing an axiomatic 
basis as follows. 
 
Axiom I. Each autonomous system can be represented by Ξ its inner state space. The 
(inner) state of the system is completely described by γ an attractor basin – a subset in 
Ξ. ■ 
 
In this paper, the inner state space is understood as equivalent to the phase space – an 
imaginary, not necessarily completely determined but representable map of all the 
possibilities open to the system. 
 
Definition 1. Two states of a system, γ1 and γ2, are called orthogonal, written γ1 ⊥ γ2, if 
γ1 implies the negation of γ2, or vice versa. ■ 
 
Definition 2. For a subset of states Γ ⊂ Ξ, its orthogonal complement is 
. ■ }γγ:γ{γ ′′| ⊥Γ∈∀Γ∈=Γ ⊥⊥
 
Definition 3. Γ ⊂ Ξ is orthogonally closed if Γ = Γ⊥⊥. ■ 
 
Accordingly, the orthogonal closure implies the existence of a distinction; non-
orthogonal states can only be distinguished in a statistical sense. 
 
Axiom II. Each observable state (i.e. representation or behavior) of the system can be 
specified as α an orthogonally closed subset of the attractor basin γ, α ⊂ γ, α = α⊥⊥, and 
as the smallest such set. ■ 
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Somewhat similarly with a quantum system, the autonomous system is observationally 
in multiple states simultaneously: at every single moment, more than just one 
representation of the system state can be made. This is formally elucidated with the 
following theorem: 
 
Context Theorem. For every two distinct representations α ≠ β, α⊂ Ξ and β⊂ Ξ, there 
exists a context representation δ ⊆ α ∪ β ⊂ Ξ such that ∀ω ⊂ Ξ, if ω ⊥ α and ω ⊥ β, 
then ω ⊥ δ. 
 
Proof: 
Let us consider two states γ1 ≠ γ2 characterized by two representations α ≠ β, 
respectively. One can virtually always define an observable π ⊆ α ∪ β characterizing 
some γ3, γ3 ≠ γ1 and γ3 ≠ γ2. Since π ∩ α ≠ ∅ and π ∩ β ≠ ∅, π cannot be determined 
orthogonal to α or to β. Furthermore, for all the states γ4, γ4 ⊥ γ1 and γ4 ⊥ γ2, with 
representations ω different from both α and β, ω ∩ (α ∪ β) = ∅, γ3 ⊥ γ4 as γ3 ∩ γ4 = ∅. 
Hence, π is a context representation of α and β. ■ 
 
Definition IV. The dynamics of coupled autonomous systems are given by an n-tuple of 
pairs of recurrent equations defined as follows: 
 
  (1) 
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Figure 3: Coupling of autonomous systems (the case of n = 2). 
where R k, j denotes a representation (i.e. observable or observed realization) of S an 
inner state of a k-type system at [tj-1,tj] a discrete time interval, tj-1<tj, j=1,2,…, k=n-i+1, 
i=1,…,n; n determines the depth of coupling, δin is the Kronecker delta: δin=1 iff i=n, 
and δin=0, otherwise; E and I are time-dependent operators specifying dynamics of the 
coupled systems at the macro- (as for an observer) and micro- levels, respectively. ■ 
 
Equations (1) provide a formalization of the system-theoretic portrayal of 
communication as mutually-orienting behavior of coupled autonomous systems (also 
see Figure 3). To move on with the modeling and maintain the discussion at a 
reasonably straightforward and conceivable level of abstraction, it is now convenient for 
us to give a semiotic interpretation to the set-theoretic concepts introduced above. For 
the sake of simplicity (but with no loss in generality), we will employ Peirce’s triadic 
scheme for a sign which is then the relationship between a sign vehicle (i.e. the physical 
sign), its object (i.e. the signified entity), and its interpretant (i.e. the result of an 
interpretation of the physical sign). 
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Definition V. In terms of Definition IV, we will call object an observable of an inner 
state of a l-type autonomous coupled system. The inner state of an p-type system, p ≥ l, 
engaged in the self-adaptation process is an interpretant that may be related with the 
object through its (the object’s) sign that is an observable of an inner state of an m-type 
system, m ≥ l, m ≠ p; l, p, m = 1, 2, … . ■ 
 
Definition V dictates a necessary condition for semiotic triads: there must be at least 
two systems, each of a different type, to ensure the existence of the object-sign-
interpretant relationship. Obviously, a sufficient condition is the existence of a relation 
(e.g. associative) between the sign and the interpretant. The latter can also be 
understood as a synchronicity constraint for the time-intervals: the sign and its 
interpretant, though not necessarily its object, must develop simultaneously (this 
accounts for the fact that, in terms of time intervals j, communication is experiential in 
principle and thus retroactive, not prospective, in respect to the phenomena it describes). 
 
A typical (and the classical – the conveyor-tube) case would be to consider the coupling 
of autonomous systems of two different types (i.e. n = 2, in terms of Definition IV): 
psychic (e.g. humans) and social (e.g. a language). Observables R2 of the social system 
– signs – correspond to a socially recognized and anticipatedly effective representation 
(i.e. behavioral pattern) of a concept from S2 a class of possible concepts, while 
observables R1 of the psychic systems stand for a representation (as ‘externalized,’ e.g. 
utterance) of S1 conceived perceptions and ideas. The role of the social system is to 
filter, or authorize, communication out of human behavior but, on the other hand, to 
buffer the behavior against the rational uniformity of socio-cultural norms. Owing to the 
autonomy of the systems involved, the social system does not (and cannot) impose a 
‘standard’ of communicative behavior, but rather serves to propagate among the psychic 
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systems regularities enabling coordination of their behavior. An extended (e.g. Peircian) 
vision of communication assumes a grounding in the physical world and therefore 
requires taking into consideration the third type of coupled systems – physical. Signs 
may, in this case, be seen as mediators allowing some sort of vocabulary learning or 
acquisition, or self-adaptation induced by the ‘laws’ of nature (i.e. by the inner states of 
the physical environment as they are ‘externalized’ and/or perceived). 
 
At this point, the task of the modeling of communication can effectively be reduced to 
the task of the specification of semiotic triads, for instance – as they are manifested with 
signs. Indeed, the sufficient condition for the development of triads stipulates that there 
is a perceptible connection – coupling – between systems of two different types. Given 
the definition of the systems’ dynamics with equations (1), this coupling will, 
eventually, result in behavioral coordination of the systems of at least one type, as for 
any kind of social (i.e. cooperative) activity, these systems will experientially have to 
‘classify’ their shared environment (i.e. the systems of the other type) into a set of 
attractor basins – recurring behavior clusters or behavioral patterns. In the sense of 
Definitions IV-V, communication thus assumes the development (though not the a 
priori existence) of triadic sign relationships. 
 
It is important to note that since at least one element of the triad – the interpretant – is, 
as stated by Axiom II, observable always only to an extent, any communication has to 
be representationally uncertain in respect to the phenomena it describes (e.g. the inner 
states of the systems in focus). More formally, this fact is illustrated with the following 
proposition formulated in semiotic terms. 
 
Closure Lemma. A communication is orthogonally closed: 
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a) pragmatically through the laws of nature in the sense that given an interpretant 
γ, it is only the physical laws determining the observation process that affect the 
‘choice’ of (or association with) its object α, so that α = α⊥⊥; 
b) semantically through the psychic system in the sense that given a psychic system 
and a distinction classification of its states by interpretants, it is only this 
classification – the semantics of objects – that determines the objects (i.e. 
categorizes or else quantizes the environment) for the psychic system; and 
c) syntactically through the social system in the sense that given a social system, it 
is only the behavior (i.e. observables) of other type systems – psychic and/or 
physical – that determines a distinction classification of its states and hence 
determines the possible signs.  ■ 
In view of Definitions IV and V, the proof of this lemma is a direct corollary of Context 
Theorem and is self-evident. 
 
The above lemma states that while the inner states corresponding to every physically 
possible object should, in principle, uniquely determine the communication situation, 
the object corresponding to each psychic state does not have to be unique. It also entails 
that in reality, every single communication is orthogonally closed only to a degree. 
Indeed, given a communication situation, its pragmatic closure can be established if one 
considers typically a huge number of objects – in fact, all possible objects, which are to 
express the physical frames of the situation and to precisely grasp the corresponding 
inner (e.g. physical or psychic) state. The latter is not a practical case unless one 
considers learning by trial and error or a similar process, and objects are the result of 
some relations (not necessarily conventions) developed from individual experience – the 
classifying of the environment by interpretants, rather than exhaustive representations of 
the related inner states. Moreover, semantic closure is hardly reachable, because to hold, 
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it requires the definition of all the objects for all the inner states. This is unrealistic 
owing to the spatio-temporal dynamics uniquely allocating each system every time, the 
indirect (i.e. incomplete, in the sense of Axiom II) character of state assessment, and the 
natural cognitive limitations (e.g. the memory limits). This, as well as the fact that social 
systems are generally dynamic in respect to their constituents (i.e. the coupled psychic 
systems), makes the achievement of syntactic closure highly unfeasible, too. Therefore, 
every single communication is representationally uncertain. 
 
It can be shown that having defined the orthogonal syntactic (or semantic) closure, one 
can always reconstruct the state(s) of the social (or psychic) system, though not the 
communication situation formed by the inner states, as there will always be an 
uncertainty caused by the ‘externality’ – in respect to the social (and psychic) system – 
of the pragmatic closure. This once again explicates the principal fallacy of the notion 
of ‘efficiency’ in transmission-focused communication models: any estimate based on 
the comparison of ‘sent’ and ‘received’ representations can have an arbitrary meaning 
(e.g. the ‘history’ or even ‘prediction’ rather than description of phenomena), depending 
on the inner, partially hidden state of the described system (e.g. physical) at the times of 
the sending and receiving. A measure free of the contingent amendments caused by 
pragmatic uncertainty could be an estimate of the behavioral coordination of coupled 
systems. 
 
Definition VI. For communicating systems of the same type (as it is stipulated by 
Definition IV), the efficiency of communication is determined by COR(t) a 
characteristic of their observed behavioral coordination specified as follows: 
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COR(t) shows how the corresponding closure is changed through communication: as 
behavioral coordination produces contextual relations between representations (i.e. 
categorizes or quantizes the environment), it should reduce the number of distinct inner 
states (i.e. interpretants) associated with the given communication situation or, in other 
words, it should reduce the uncertainty of communication – increase COR – by 
propagating a particular behavioral pattern resultant of the classifying of the 
environment (in other words, of the ‘narrowing of choice’). 
 
Experiment 
To illustrate the proposed measure of communication efficiency, we have conducted an 
experiment. The behavioral coordination has been estimated by calculating COR(t) for 
hypermedia-based communication by an experienced system user (the expert), by a user 
with no a-priori knowledge of the same system (the non-expert), and by the non-expert 
using an advanced interface of the same system, which is capable of adaptation to the 
user’s language, based on feedback. The words comprising the interface – ‘keywords’ – 
were processed as signs (i.e. observables R in formula (2)) by assuming that the 
documents indexed with them correspond to the inner states S (seen as, for instance, 
goal-states; one state per every distinct document). Figure 4 shows the results of the 
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Figure 4: Hypermedia-based communication as behavioral coordination. 
experiment for the first 5 signs: the thin marked lines show the behavioral coordination 
for a typical single communication by the three users, and the bold show the average of 
over 20 communications on different (but related) topics (some more details on the 
adaptive interface and the experiment methodology can be found in Kryssanov et al. 
2002). It should be understood that while COR(t) is discrete by its very nature, the lines 
were drawn to display the characteristic trends. 
 
The figure indicates that the uncertainty of communication by the expert quickly 
converges to a specific value as in this case, there is no or almost no learning of the 
(system’s) language (and, probably, of the communication topic – the system domain), 
and this value is likely to reflect the pragmatic uncertainty specific to the given 
hypermedia system. In the case of the non-expert using the same system, the uncertainty 
of communication is increased through observation over the examined time interval that 
may mostly be due to learning about the social language utilized by the system. Finally, 
the uncertainty of communication by the non-expert with the adaptive interface quickly 
converges to low values (i.e. to high values of COR(t)) corresponding to better, even if 
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comparing with the case of the expert, behavioral coordination. For the latter, the 
question remains if the interface was ‘too adaptive’ and filtered out too many relevant 
documents not covered by the user’s feedback. This, however, does not refer to the 
communication process, but rather to the classifying ability of the user and/or the 
interface. It is evident that a ‘good’ (i.e. efficient, in the sense of mutual orientation) 
interface of an information system should provide for low variation of COR(t) (that is 
convenient to examine using, due to Weber-Fechner Law, a logarithmic scale). 
 
Towards a Physics of Meaning-Making 
One may already notice that the formalization of the semiotic terms proposed in the 
previous section with Definitions IV and V implicitly ascertains that Peirce’s and de 
Saussure’s conceptualizations of the sign relationship can be considered practically 
equivalent, unless the modeled communication process (i.e. the coordinated behavior) 
persistently refers to or is strongly affected by, or tangled with a third-type system, for 
instance – the physical environment. Reformulating this, the equivalence of the triadic 
(Peircian) and dyadic (de Saussure’s) systems of semiotic coordinates depends on 
whether the asynchronicity in object and sign (both as observables) dynamics can 
effectively be neglected, i.e. it depends on the observable (discernable – as detected or 
measured) depth of coupling. Since no model can be validated theoretically, in this 
section we will endeavor to find a way for empirical estimation of the efficient (from 
the standpoint of the modeling simplicity) depth of coupling (i.e. the number of semiotic 
dimensions) necessary to unequivocally describe communication by investigating the 
dynamics of observed realizations (i.e. representations) of coupled system inner states. 
To do so, we have first to elaborate on a mathematical model of the representation 
dynamics that would also elucidate the conceptual definitions from the previous section. 
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Let us briefly recapitulate some of our main premises. We postulated that the same (i.e. 
uniquely characterized by microparameters) inner state of an autonomous coupled 
system can have different observed realizations (such as, the same meaning can be 
expressed in many ways, the same sign can signify multiple concepts, and the same 
object serves as an indicator of various ‘internal’ and thus hidden processes). In order 
for communicating systems to guarantee their behavioral coordination can be achieved 
in a finite time (or, viewing this differently, to guarantee that communication conveys in 
principle finite meaning), the number of observed realizations must be finite for at least 
one type of the coupled autonomous systems. This makes the communication process 
observationally cyclic and representationally constrained: recurrence of identical 
representations is inevitable, given a sufficient observation time (it can well be 
illustrated by the fact that ‘traditional’ communication media, such as languages, 
encompass always a finite number of socially recognized representations – signs). 
 
We will seek to determine the distribution of z(t) the occurrence number of a 
representation across increasing expenditures of time (e.g. it can be understood as the 
distribution of the occurrence frequency of a word in a document) that in practice means 
to determine  a cumulative distribution function (CDF) and/or its differential 
analog –  a probability density function (PDF) of z (these functions completely 
characterize statistical properties of a stochastic variable and are related as 
; P(A) denotes the probability of event A occurring). Under 
the above assumptions, z(t) can be defined as follows (the reader unfamiliar with or 
uncommitted to formal statistical derivation techniques can skip ahead to the final result 
– formula (9) and the description of an experiment at the section’s end; the interested 
)(F z
)z
=≤ x)
(f
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x
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reader can otherwise consult one of the standard textbooks on statistical analysis, e.g. 
Walpole and Myers 1993): 
 
 )()( 0 ttz τθ= , (3) 
 
where τ0(t) is the representation rate, and θ is the observation time – a behavioral 
microparameter that we will interpret as interaction tempo. 
 
Owing to Context Theorem, there are multiple representations of a given (inner) state. A 
number of statistically independent factors, including those due to semantics (i.e. 
idiosyncratic experience), syntax (i.e. socio-cultural norms), and pragmatics (i.e. 
circumstantial anticipations and/or effects), determine their rates τi(t), and some of these 
factors influence the observed realization by increasing or decreasing its rate τ0(t). 
Temporal changes of τi(t) are controlled by a ‘competition’ process, which can be 
thought of as representational decision-making (conscious or otherwise), and in which 
different representations compete for the time available to ‘connote’ or ‘externalize’ the 
inner state. Changes of the available time – representation time dissipation – can be 
estimated by calculating the difference in the state and its representation rates. The 
dynamics of τi(t) can then be approximated with a diffusion process represented by 
noisy differential equations (the book by Ghez (2001) provides a thorough introduction 
to diffusion processes; similar diffusion processes have been studied in cellular biology, 
Czirok et al. 1998): 
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where µ is the inner state rate, N is the number of competing (i.e. potentially available) 
representations, i=0,1,…,N; ηi(t) is due to a noise-induced (i.e. random) variation in 
representation rates and is a Gaussian stochastic variable with zero mean; ai(t)>0, and 
1≥ρ  is a parallelism (or, looking at it from the other side, redundancy) coefficient – a 
(medium-driven) microparameter to account for the apparent concurrency in 
representing the inner state. 
 
The system of differential equations (4) describes the process of meaning (i.e. inner 
state) observational diffusion in the vicinity of  the (imaginary) hyperplane 
formed by the meaning’s possible representations. One can show that, given a sufficient 
time and N >> 1, this process yields an exponential probability distribution for z with 
 a cumulative distribution function estimated as follows (Czirok et al. 1998): 
∑
=
=
N
j
j
0
τµρ
)(F1 z
 
 ,  (5) zz λ−−∝ e1)(F1
where 
 θρ
ελ = , (6) 
 
and τε
1=  is the average representation time for 
1+= N
µτ  the average representation 
rate of a given inner state. (The PDF of an exponential distribution has the following 
form: .) z-e)( λλ=zf
 
It is remarkable, that despite the oversimplified character of the specification of the 
‘diffusion’ of an inner state over its observed realizations with equations (4), the 
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exponential behavior (5) will hold for a wide class of models, e.g. when some of the 
parameters assumed herein as ‘stationary’ or constant commence changing with time, 
when some of the apparently independent factors determining representation rates prove 
mutual dependence, etc. Equation (5) thus dictates that for a solitary inner state-
meaning, its observables-representations are distributed exponentially. 
 
Based on the assertion that the same representation can ‘stand for’ different inner states, 
we can now extend the obtained result to the case of a large number of inner states 
observed simultaneously (e.g. throughout the communication process) as follows: 
 
 , (7) ∫
∞
−=
0
0 e)()( λλλϕ λ dzf z
 
where  is the PDF of z, and ϕ (λ) is the PDF of λ. )(0 zf
 
The latter generalization partially accounts for the fact that in the case of complex 
autonomous systems, a measured stochastic variable (z, in our case) reflecting a 
system’s behavior is, as a rule, a sum of random variables, where each of the summands 
accounts for the system’s behavior in a steady or stationary state with certain parameters 
of the system’s internal regulatory mechanisms.  accordingly specifies the 
distribution function of the representation occurrence number for the inner states 
characterized by the existence of different microparameters shaping a single distribution 
of λ. However, since communication hinges on the coupling of systems of different 
nature (e.g. cognitive, social, and physical) and with different properties that should 
well be expected to cause different distributions of λ, equation (7) should be 
reformulated to a still more universal form: 
)(0 zf
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where M is the number of distributions of λ, and ci gives the probability to observe the 
‘i-th type’ states (that is, in the context of our study, identical to observing the ‘i-th type’ 
systems) in communication. It is important to note that in the statistical sense, n the 
depth of coupling (see Definition IV) determines and theoretically limits M. 
 
So far, we did not make any assumption about ϕ (λ) the PDF of the composite 
parameter λ, and our result – the distribution equation (8) – is fairly general but is hard 
to validate or apply in practice because it yields no specific functional form. It is clear 
from equation (6) that as long as θ and ρ are constant, the distribution of λ depends on 
that of the representation time ε. The latter is a stochastic variable determined by, at 
least in the case of human communication, the durations of higher nervous activities, the 
exact distribution function of which is not yet known. There is increasing evidence from 
neurophysiology and psychophysics, however, that a Gamma distribution provides a 
reasonably good approximation (see Luce 1986). By substituting the Gamma PDF into 
equation (7), and after specializing and integrating equation (8), we finally obtain: 
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where bi and νi are distribution parameters (it can be shown that ]E[1 i
iii
i
b
ερθ
ν ∝ , ]E[ε  
denotes the mean of ε ), and i=1,…,M. 
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To summarize: the probability density function of z the representation occurrence 
number in communication is specified by the sum (9) that is a result of the process of 
diffusion of a) observationally – inner states over their representations, or b) internally 
(e.g. interpretationally) – representations over their inner states, with parameters 
dependent on higher nervous activities (ε), behavioral characteristics (θ ), and efficiency 
of representation (ρ). 
 
Experiment 
To explore our theoretical findings and validate the resultant statistical model, we have 
conducted an experiment and compared probabilities of a word predicted by the model 
(9) with word actual occurrence frequencies in different text- and hypertext-based 
communications. Two samples of text (corpora) and two – of hypertext data have been 
analyzed. A set of short science fiction stories written by different authors in English 
were randomly selected and downloaded from http://www.planetmag.com to 
form an English text collection; a Russian text collection was analogously created from 
texts posted at http://www.lib.ru/INOFANT. Two collections of hypertext 
included connected (within the site) Web-pages randomly selected and downloaded 
from http://www.cnn.com and from http://www.cbsnews.com. All the 
texts were raw texts (English and Russian, respectively), where we ignored the 
punctuation and turned all word-forms into lower-case. Different word-forms were left 
unchanged and treated as different representations. All the hypertexts were stripped of 
multimedia and technical contents (including commercial ads), so that only English 
texts remained, which were then preprocessed in the same way as the two text 
collections. 
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We calculated the occurrence number of words in the prepared texts and hypertexts that 
made up four data samples. These data samples thus contain results of the measurement 
of the occurrence frequency of a representation (i.e. word) performed at different times 
in two hypermedia- and two text- based communications. 
 
Maximum likelihood estimators (see Walpole and Myers 1993) were used to evaluate 
the parameters of the theoretical model (9), which was appropriately adjusted to deal 
with discrete data. The coefficients ci as well as the number of summands M (that can be 
interpreted as the empirically discerned depth of coupling) were sought through a 
pareto-optimization procedure (Pareto-optimal means that it is not possible to make one 
parameter better fit without making other parameters worse fit) by minimizing χ2 the 
chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic. Figure 5 shows results of the experiment in the 
graphical form along with characteristics of the data samples and calculated parameters 
of the model. 
 
It has been found that M = 2 provides a statistically sound fit: correlation coefficient r ∼ 
0.99 (i.e. the plots are clearly linear lines), together with the slope ∼ 1.0 in all four plots, 
permits us to claim that the real data and the synthetic (i.e. calculated based on the 
model) data are from the same distribution. It is interesting to note that the calculated 
values of the ci coefficients are in a good agreement with the fact that natural language 
words can be classified into ‘service/function’ and ‘content’ words, which roughly make 
up 40-45% and 55-60% of the lexicon, respectively (Naranan and Balasubrahmanyan 
1992). We could speculate that service/function words are indeed ‘products,’ in the 
statistical sense, of the social system, whereas content words are ‘products’ of psychic 
systems. 
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e representation dynamics of communication and, hence, the dyadic – two-
t – modeling is already sufficient in the statistical sense. Besides, given the 
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A Little Related Work and Discussion 
Although in jeopardy of being accused of reductionism, this paper has demonstrated, 
however unequivocally, that quantification and mathematical discourse can contribute 
to semiotics studies. On the other hand, it also demonstrated that the ‘quantification’ 
(though, given the relativistic character of the formalism, not ‘mechanization’) of the 
semiotic discourse does open new horizons in information system design, 
communication, and complex system theory. As a truly interdisciplinary research, the 
presented study covers a number of domains, and an adequate survey of related work in 
semiotics, cognitive science, sociology, linguistics, physics, computer science, etc. 
would quickly exceed the frames of one article. We thus selected for outline here only 
the works most important and/or influential to our theory. This should add to the 
discussion carried out throughout the previous sections. 
 
In view of the two questions risen in Introduction – whether the realm of the ‘mental’ is 
that of the natural sciences, and what would be a foundation for a general 
communication theory, it was chiefly Andersen’s ‘Dynamic Semiotics’ (Andersen 
2002) that motivated us to look for a solution by compromising, refining, and (re-) 
defining semiotic concepts from positions of sociology and system theory. In 
pragmatically pursuing the development of theoretical principles for the design and 
analysis of hypermedia systems, we utilized the system-theoretic view of a complex 
system’s representational closure first devised by Francis Heylighen (Heylighen 1990). 
Our quantum-physics-inspired axiomatic basis further develops – mathematically 
particularizes but expands to the general case of system theory – Gibson’s concept of 
affordances (Gibson 1979), which are behavioral patterns of physical or biological 
significance, and Stamper’s norms (Stamper 1996), which are the social counterpart of 
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affordances (i.e. socially created patterns of behavior): these two are understood as 
observables of autonomous system inner states. Furthermore, our vision of a social 
system is rather close to Stamper’s definition of an organization – a group of people 
who not merely share rules of language, customs, and habits, but also actively (due to 
the coupling) participate in the social construction of these rules. Our definition of 
communication rests on the qualitative description of the process given by di Paolo in 
his original work on the evolution of languages (di Paolo 1998), and it conceptually 
resembles Niklas Luhmann’s declaration that communication is not transmission but the 
recursive ‘use’ of signs to generate signs, as information is an inner (psychic or 
conscious) state change, which does not exist externally and therefore cannot be 
transmitted (Luhmann 1995). We however do not adhere Luhmann’s isolationistic 
vision of communication itself as a self-organizing system, but rather view it as a (by-) 
product of the coupling of such systems. Our theorization is therefore closer to 
Maturana and Valera’s discussion of communication and ‘languaging’ (Maturana and 
Varela 1980) as coordination of coordination (through the coupling of different type 
systems, in our case), and to the mainstream of Semiotics of Systems (Rocha 2000; 
Lemke 2000) and Second Order Cybernetics (Heylighen 2003). 
 
Philosophically speaking, this study, although it did not completely deny the canonical 
hypothesis of ‘ever unbroken’ semiotic triad (as stated in Peirce 1998), it came to a 
principally new level of presentation of semiosis processes, specifically – the semiosis 
of communication, by shifting the focus to the (a)synchronicity in the developments of 
objects, interpretants, and signs. We demonstrated that while communication as 
coordinated behavior builds on the existence, at least potential, of completed semiotic 
triads, the dyadic modeling in terms of signifiers and signifieds (i.e. without explicitly 
referring to the environment) should, in many practical cases, suffice to analyze 
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miscellaneous communication phenomena. In this way, our work somewhat opposes the 
recently popular (but rarely empirically supported) opinion in computer science that the 
triadic analysis scheme has obvious advantages when describing information 
transmission processes (e.g. see Condon 2000). 
 
Now turning to the quantification of the semiotic account, we must mention the work by 
Ed Stephan, a sociologist, who convincingly demonstrated the power of the methods 
and tools of statistical physics in social studies (Stephan 2004). By adopting the 
metaphor of diffusion, we derived a formal (and hence computational), enclosed, and 
self-sufficient dynamic model of (representation-based) communication, which thereby 
does not depend directly on any other communication model, but can itself be 
specialized by taking on results obtained in other disciplines, such as physiology and 
linguistics. This model, along with the formulated axioms, creates the basis for the 
development of a general (system-theoretic semiotic) communication theory, which 
would ultimately replace the classical conveyor-tube framework. 
 
Our experiments are straightforward but have a number of advantages over previous 
work. Analysis of communicability of hypermedia systems (such as the entire World-
Wide Web or distributed multimedia databases) has been a hot research topic in 
theoretical computer science in the past decade (de Souza 1993; Goguen 1999; Condon 
2000), yet so far with surprisingly few consequences for information system design: 
while the sophistication of design models has been growing, their practical value 
remains questionable, owing to the lack of formalization of the models’ institutional 
concepts. The simple set-theoretic measure of behavioral coordination proposed in this 
paper proved a meaningful and, we believe, useful characteristic of the communication 
process (notably that similar but essentially static measures, such as Jaccard Coefficient, 
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are long known in taxonomic studies). Statistical models of the representational 
dynamics were, on the other hand, abundant in quantitative linguistics over the past 50 
years (for a bibliography, see Glottometrics 2002). Again surprisingly however, none of 
them is general enough to describe hypermedia-based communication, and none of them 
is statistically sound to accord with raw (i.e. without artful preprocessing but ‘as is’) 
empirical data. The model written with formulas (3-9) incorporates (in the formal sense, 
i.e. it can be specialized or reduced to) results of the earlier work in quantitative 
linguistics, such as by Mandelbrot (Mandelbrot 1960), and it demonstrates an excellent 
agreement between the theory and experiment. Besides, it methodologically provides a 
good starting point for a detailed and deeper analysis of the communication mechanisms 
(for instance, by explicitly assigning the initial conditions for the diffusion equation) 
and multimedia information systems (for instance, by varying the number of 
‘competing’ media and/or their parameters). The latter could also help statistically 
explain or justify the rationale of the semiotic categorization of signs by their role (e.g. 
sign as ‘symbol,’ ‘index,’ or ‘icon’) as well as the ‘reasonable’ (i.e. statistically 
discernable) number of such sign clusters (or categories). 
 
Conclusion 
Given the fact that theoretical analysis and empirical validation is fundamental to any 
model, whether conceptual or formal, it is simply astonishing that these two tools of 
scientific discovery are so often ignored in the contemporary studies of communication. 
In this paper, we pursued the ideas of a) correcting and expanding the modeling 
approaches of linguistics, which are otherwise inapplicable (more precisely, which 
should not but are widely applied), to the general case of hypermedia-based 
communication, and b) developing techniques for empirical validation of semiotic 
models, which are nowadays routinely used to ‘explore’ (in fact, to conjecture about) 
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internal mechanisms of complex systems, yet on a purely speculative basis. This study 
thus offers two experimentally tested substantive contributions: the formal 
representation of communication as the mutually-orienting behavior of coupled 
autonomous systems, and the mathematical interpretation of the semiosis of 
communication, which together offer a concrete and parsimonious understanding of 
diverse communication phenomena. This understanding, however, still lacks many 
details, such as the explicit relationship between the state spaces and time dynamics of 
different type coupled systems. In terms of future work, the first obvious step would 
then be to clarify the definition of the hierarchy of the coupling systems and explore 
characteristic time scales on different levels of the hierarchy. 
 
As a final (and probably ‘far too late’) remark, we would like to stress that as soon as 
computing and information systems have become a popular topic of semiotic research, 
further ignoring the formal aspects of semiotic models will make such research virtually 
useless. It is thus our hope that simply the presence of a handful of formulas in this 
paper will not alienate but rather encourage the reader to deeper into understanding 
semiosis and socio-semiotic phenomena and to sharpen the language surrounding the 
semiotic study of computer-mediated communication. 
 
The presented work has been made within ‘The Universal Design of the Digital City’ 
project funded by the Japan Science and Technology Corporation. 
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Figure 1: Information system and the transmission of messages. 
Figure 2: Semiosis of hypermedia-based communication. 
Figure 3: Coupling of autonomous systems (the case of n = 2). 
Figure 4: Hypermedia-based communication as behavioral coordination. 
Figure 5: Histograms of the predicted occurrence frequency versus the observed 
occurrence frequency plotted on a log-log scale: A – CNN hypertexts (7.3Mb, 
vocabulary size ∼ 1.0mln. words), B – CBS hypertexts (11.4Mb, 1.8mln. words), C – 
English texts (6.5Mb, 1.1mln. words), and D – Russian texts (3.1Mb, 0.45mln. words). 
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